This paper presents an assignment model of CEOs and …rms. The distributions of CEO pay levels and …rms'market values are analyzed as the competitive equilibrium of a matching market where talents, as well as CEO positions, are scarce. It is shown how the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value can then be used to infer the economic value of underlying ability di¤erences. The variation in CEO pay is found to be mostly due to variation in …rm characteristics, whereas implied di¤erences in managerial ability are small and make relatively little di¤erence to shareholder value.
Introduction
The predominant fact about executive pay is that large …rms pay their CEOs more than small …rms. The elasticity of CEO pay to …rm size has been estimated at about 0.3 using various measures of …rm size. 1 The literature on executive compensation has mainly focused on its incentive properties, while the level of pay has received less attention. Most studies of CEO pay conduct the analysis at the level of a CEO-…rm pair, where the level of pay is meant to compensate for optimal e¤ort or risk bearing relative to an exogenous outside opportunity. In this paper the distribution of CEO pay is analyzed as the competitive equilibrium of a market where heterogeneous …rms and individuals match. We develop a simple assignment model and show how it can be used to infer the unobserved distribution of ability from the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value. The model can then be calibrated to measure the social value of scarce executive ability and to gauge the extent to which observed levels of CEO pay can be explained by di¤erences in talent and to what extent by variation of …rm size.
Intuition suggests that the economic impact of a manager's decisions depends on the amount of resources under his control, so that the observed relation of …rm size and CEO pay levels is a re ‡ection of scarce executive ability being worth more to larger …rms. That this relation should result in high levels and a skewed distribution of income for CEOs was proposed by Mayer (1960) , who termed this the "scale-of-operations"e¤ect. In a similar spirit, Manne (1965) argued that a major bene…t of corporate mergers and takeovers is to allocate the control of resources according to managerial abilities. Lucas (1978) invoked Manne's suggestion to devise a theory of …rm size distribution based on the allocation of capital to a population of potential managers of heterogeneous ability. Rosen (1982) presented a related model with a focus on the division of labor into managers and workers and the allocation of subordinate labor between managers. In all these models, …rms are inherently homogeneous: In equilibrium, all size di¤erences between …rms, as well as di¤erences in CEO pay, arise from the heterogeneity of managerial ability. Any di¤erences among …rms are merely a manifestation of the mechanism by which the variation in talent is magni…ed into higher variation in CEO pay. As a result, all di¤erences in CEO pay are 1 See the survey by Murphy (1999) , and Kostiuk (1990) whose data goes back to 1930's. 1 then necessarily explained by di¤erences in talent, either directly or via the scale of operations e¤ect.
In the spirit of Rosen (1982) , we develop a model where "the distributions of …rm size and managerial reward are the joint outcomes of the same underlying problem." However, we will argue that not just individuals, but also …rms are di¤erentiated by important indivisible characteristics that cannot easily be shu-ed among …rms. In other words, there is also an exogenous …rm-speci…c component behind the cross-sectional variation in …rm size. This simple feature has far-reaching implications for the understanding of CEO pay. It means that an assignment model is needed to understand the determination of the levels of CEO pay. 2 In an assignment model, di¤erent types of indivisible units of production-here managers and …rms-are matched in …xed proportions, and the equilibrium distributions of income to both factors depend in a non-obvious way on the full distributions of the qualities of both factors. In particular, the competitive price of ability does not re ‡ect its marginal productivity in the usual sense of the term.
The assignment model of CEOs and …rms to be applied in this paper was …rst presented in Terviö (2003) . It builds on the "di¤erential rents" model of Sattinger (1979) by adding adjustable capital that is endogenously allocated between the matched pairs of …rms and managers. 3 The basic simplifying assumption is that there is a competitive and frictionless labor market for executive ability, which is equally applicable in all companies, but is more productive at larger companies. Even though all …rms would rather hire the most able individual for the job, it is the companies where ability is at its most productive that will pay the most for it and therefore attract the best individuals. In equilibrium, each …rm must prefer hiring its CEO at his equilibrium pay level to hiring any other company's CEO at his or her pay level. The setup has a continuous distribution of workers and …rms, which rules out match-speci…c rents and, therefore, any need to model bargaining, and a complementary production function which generates positive assortative matching (here meaning the matching of the best 2 The seminal assignment models are Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Tinbergen (1956 Tinbergen ( , 1957 . 3 See also the survey of assignment models by Sattinger (1993) , which includes a detailed exposition of the "di¤erential rents" model.
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managers with the largest …rms). In this setup, the pay levels of individuals depend on the distributions of …rm size and CEO ability in the economy in a relatively straightforward way.
The basic assignment model shows how the economic surplus produced by matched pairs of CEOs and …rms gets divided into incomes. However, the …rms'share of this surplus is not directly observable in the data: Market values are equilibrium outcomes, into which the e¤ects of both current and future CEOs are capitalized. Also, part of …rms' capital stock may be adjustable even in the short run; however, any income accruing to such adjustable assets is not determined according to the assignment model (instead, adjustable assets should just earn their marginal product). We extend the basic assignment model to resolve these issues, and then show how the model can be used to infer the unobserved distributions of ability and …rm characteristics (up to undetermined constants) from the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value. The model can then be used to answer quantitative questions about the e¤ects of CEO ability on pro…ts and CEO pay. However, these questions necessarily take the form of counterfactuals about the distributions of ability or …rm size.
In the empirical part we use CompuStat data on the 1000 largest publicly traded companies in the US in 1994-2004. First we quantify the relative importance of heterogeneity in ability and …rm size toward explaining the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay. As will be explained, the value of existing ability can only be measured relative to some counterfactual distribution of replacement CEOs. Our main counterfactual is the di¤erence that CEOs make to total economic surplus, compared to if they were all replaced by the lowest type CEO in the sample. In 2004, this added value was about $21-25 billion, of which the top CEOs received $4.4 billion in total as a rent to their scarce ability. The remainder is capitalized in market values, and is quite small compared to the total market value of $12.6 trillion. Similarly, the additional value if all CEOs became as good as the current highest type would be worth less than $3.5 billion. Such an increase in ability levels would be associated with a decrease of over $1 billion in total CEO pay (as increased competition would reduce the Ricardian component in the rents to top CEOs), leaving a net gain of about $4.5 billion for the shareholders.
By contrast, if abilities remained unchanged but the existing …rms were replaced by the 1000th largest type, the e¤ects on CEO pay would be much more dramatic. Under status quo, the CEO at the largest …rm is expected to earn over $15 million more a year than the CEO at the 1000th largest; this pay di¤erence would be cut by a factor of 5. In total, the rents to ability would be reduced from $4.4 billion to less than $2 billion. If, on the other hand, all …rms were as large as the actual biggest …rm, then total CEO rents would increase by about a factor of 100, with the highest types expecting to earn over $700 million per year. We conclude that the observed high levels of top CEOs are mainly due to …rm scale rather than the scarce ability of CEOs.
We then investigate how well the assignment model can explain the recent ‡uctuations in the levels of CEO pay and market values, purely based on time-variation of a single scaling parameter. We interpret this parameter as capturing the (size-neutral) variation in productivity, which interacts with current CEO ability to generate future pro…ts. By and large, the model provides a reasonable …t for the coevolution of CEO pay and market values during the sample years. However, the boom years 2000-2001 …t less well;
speci…cally the unusually highest levels of CEO pay cannot be generated from the same model that …ts in other years.
Unlike most of the literature, in this paper the structure of pay is not considered, only the level. Di¤erences in required e¤ort or risk-bearing are presumed to have less explanatory power for the variation in pay levels than individual ability and …rm-speci…c usefulness for that ability. Systemic failures and agency problems, such as, for example, the skimming explanation of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) , empire-building (Jensen, 1986) , and ratcheting (Ang and Nagel, 2006) , are likewise ignored. Our model takes a reduced-form approach to all incentive problems; the expected cost of a CEO's compensation is interpreted as the market price of the e¤ective managerial ability that can be bought with the existing contracting technology.
The upside of ignoring the structure of pay is that we are able to analyze the determination of the whole distribution of CEO pay levels as an equilibrium outcome.
A paper within the incentive literature, that is somewhat similarly motivated to this one, is Baker and Hall (2004) . They explore the relation of incentives and …rm size while assuming away di¤erences in ability. In their model, e¤ort and …rm size are allowed to be complementary, so the optimal level of e¤ort and sensitivity of compensation to market value depend on 4 …rm size. Using cross-sectional data on the structure of CEO pay and …rm size, they …nd evidence for a substantial complementarity.
The recent literature on the levels of CEO pay is mostly concerned in explaining the high growth rates of CEO pay in a competitive framework. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2005) attribute the growth to increasing generality (as opposed to …rm-speci…city) of the required managerial skills. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006) …nd evidence that increased foreign competition has raised the productivity of managerial talent. Gayle and Miller (2005) present a calibration method and …nd that the increase in …rm size has increased the cost of deterring moral hazard. Recently Gabaix and Landier (2006) also apply an assignment model to study CEO pay, adding a functional form assumption for the distribution of talent, and using market value as the exogenous measure of …rm size. They …nd that the six-fold increase of CEO pay in the US between 1980 and 2003 can be fully explained by the six-fold increase in market capitalization during that period.
The body of the paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 introduces the basic assignment model, and derives the equilibrium distributions of pay and pro…ts using a method similar to that of screening models. This section can be skimmed by those familiar with assignment models, although the solution method and the discussion of comparative statics may be of independent theoretical interest. In Section 3 the assignment model is modi…ed to take into account the speci…c features of the CEO-…rm setup. It is shown how the model can be used to back out the di¤erences in ability from the joint distribution of CEO pay and market value. The meaning and interpretation of the exogenous component if …rm size is discussed in Section 4. The empirical results are presented in Section 5.
An Assignment Model of Pay
The distinctive feature of assignment models is that productive resources are embedded in indivisible units and these units must be combined in …xed numbers to produce output. Here the units will be individual managers and …rms, and they are matched one to one. A production function describes the output resulting from matching any individual with any …rm as a function of their …xed characteristics. A particularly tractable assignment model results from three simplifying assumptions: one-dimensional qualities, continuity, 5 and complementarity. (This is the "di¤erential rents" setup of Sattinger (1979) .) The …rst two assumptions are made for analytical convenience, but the complementarity assumption is central to the analysis. Other simplifying assumptions are symmetric information and risk neutrality.
The …rst assumption means that individual and …rm characteristics affecting output can both be summed up by one number; these factor qualities will be referred to simply as "ability" and "…rm size," denoted by a and b
respectively. Note that one-dimensional ability does not preclude di¤erent individuals having di¤erent strengths contributing to their ability to a¤ect output.
Second, it is assumed that the production function is continuous and strictly increasing in both of its arguments, and that there is a unit mass of individuals and …rms with "smoothly" distributed characteristics. The distributions of a and b have continuous …nite supports without gaps; the resulting distributions of output and factor incomes will inherit these properties. Dispensing with this assumption would only complicate the notation without bringing more insights.
The substantive assumption about technology is the complementarity between ability and …rm size, i.e., that the production function has a positive cross-partial. In this case, e¢ ciency requires positive assortative matching:
the best individual must be matched with the largest …rm, the second best with the second largest etc. If the sorting were not perfect, then total output could be increased by shu-ing some individuals between …rms. 4 The equilibrium matching of individuals and …rms is thus very simple as is the determination of equilibrium output. It is the division of output into factor incomes (wages and pro…ts) that requires further analysis.
It will be convenient to refer to distributions by their inverse distribution 
If there were atoms in the distribution of a they would correspond to ‡at parts in the pro…le, while gaps in the support of a would appear as jumps.
Using the quantile i as the variable (instead of the arbitrary units of ability) the distributions of factor incomes can then intuitively be solved in a manner analogous to the standard method of solving screening models.
We believe this quantile approach to be more intuitive and tractable than the traditional method of working with density functions, especially when considering empirical applications.
Equilibrium: Determination of Pay Levels and Pro…ts
In competitive equilibrium, the pro…les of factor incomes must support the e¢ cient matching of individuals and …rms, which we know involves perfect sorting by quality. Two types of conditions must hold in competitive equilibrium. First, there are the sorting constraints: every …rm must prefer hiring its e¢ cient match at the equilibrium wage to hiring any other individual at their equilibrium wage. Second, there are the participation constraints: All …rms and individuals must be earning at least their outside income.
The outside opportunities (w 0 ; 0 ) are assumed to be the same for all units. 5
The unit mass should be thought of as a normalization of the mass of pairs of individuals and …rms that are active in equilibrium. The lowest active …rm-individual pair (i = 0) is the one that just breaks even with the outside opportunity:
The …rms are not residual claimants in any sense: The equilibrium conditions could equivalently be stated in terms of individuals hiring …rms.
The sorting constraints in (2) are mathematically analogous to the incentive compatibility conditions in a typical nonlinear pricing problem. 6 As in 5 A weaker assumption would do here, namely that the outside opportunities increase slower along the pro…le than the equilibrium incomes. 6 Note that here the technology one-to-one matching precludes "bunching"that is common in screening models.
7 nonlinear pricing problems, the amount of constraints can be reduced drastically by noticing that, for any i j k; the sum of two adjacent sorting conditions SC(i; j)+SC(j; k) implies SC(i; k). The binding constraints are the marginal sorting constraints that keep …rms from wanting to hire the next best individual, and the participation constraints of the lowest types.
Regrouping the sorting constraint SC(i; i ") and dividing it by " gives
This becomes an equality as " ! 0 and, via the de…nition of the (partial) derivative, yields the slope of the wage pro…le.
The wage pro…le itself is then obtained by integrating the slope and adding in the binding participation constraint
where Y a denotes the partial derivative. Analogously, or as the remainder from y = + w, the pro…le of pro…ts satis…es
[
All inframarginal pairs produce a surplus over the sum of their outside opportunities, and the division of this surplus depends on the distributions of factor quality. At any given point in the pro…le the increase in surplus is shared between the factors in proportion to their contributions to the increase at that quantile. 7
Due to the continuity assumptions, the factor owners do not earn rents over their next best opportunity within the industry. In a discrete model there would be a match-speci…c rent left for bargaining, as the di¤erence in the pay of two "neighboring"individuals could be anywhere between the 7 The complementary two-factor model generalizes into more factors in the natural way. In a continuous model there is nothing to be bargained over because all units have arbitrarily close competitors. If one of the pro…les has a jump at some quantile, then all of the increase in surplus at that point goes to the factor with a jump because the other side is still perfectly competitive. (There would be match-speci…c rents only if both of the exogenous factor pro…les had jumps at the exact same quantile.)
One striking feature of this model industry is that factor owners are only a¤ected by changes in the quality of those below them in the rankings.
Mathematically, this is clear from the fact that the equations for factor income pro…les take the form of integrals over the pro…les below. Intuitively, the binding constraint on any factor owner is the quality and price of their next best competitor. For example, if an individual's next best competitor becomes less productive, then she can raise her price by a …xed amount, and this price increase spills upwards along the whole pro…le by shifting the division of surplus to individuals'favor by that same …xed amount at every …rm.
A central feature to understand about the assignment model is that the unobserved productivity characteristics a and b are essentially ordinal.
Any increasing transformation of "the scale of measurement" for a factor quality, combined with the inverse change in the functional form of the production function, changes nothing of substance in the model. This means, for example, that using a Cobb-Douglas form Y (a; b) = Aa b 1 , as opposed to a simple multiplicative y = ab, would be super ‡uous, or even misleading if it causes one to believe that the income shares should have any tendency to be related to the exponents. This is a special case of a more general mistake of assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, in a situation where the amounts of two matching factors cannot be shifted across di¤erent units of production. This transferability of factors of production between …rms is what pins down the linear scale of measurement for factor qualities in the usual case, and only the total quantity of a factor of production in the economy must adhere to some budget constraint. In an assignment setup there is much less ‡exibility. The "division" of productive characteristics between the units is what it is, and the economic problem is how to match these factor units into units of production. 8 8 While it is not sensible to make predictions about the e¤ects of taxation in a model It would be incorrect to say that factors earn their marginal productivity by the usual de…nition of marginal productivity, because the increase in output if the individual of ability a[i] were to increase in ability is proportional to b[i], which is not the message of the wage equation (6). But if she were to increase in ability, then, in equilibrium, she would also move up in the ranking and be matched with a higher b-and other individuals would have to move down and experience a decrease in productivity. 9 Here we note that the "di¤erential rents"assignment models (including our model) satisfy "the No-Surplus Condition" of Ostroy (1980 Ostroy ( , 1984 , which is an alternative de…-nition for a perfectly competitive equilibrium. This means that individuals in fact do receive their marginal product, once the margin is de…ned correctly. As ability cannot conceivably be extracted from one individual and poured into another, the relevant margin here is whether an individual will participate in the industry or not-and if not, then the e¤ect of the resulting rearrangement of remaining individuals is part of the marginal product.
Comparative Statics
Uniform productivity growth If the production function Y is multiplied by some constant G but the distributions of factor qualities a and b remain unchanged, then the rents earned over the outside opportunities, w[i] w 0 from (6) and [i] 0 from (8), also change by that same multiple.
This scaling of factor incomes clearly holds for any production function and any distributional assumption, because such productivity growth is mathematically equivalent to changing the units of measurement for output. If the outside opportunities (w 0 , 0 ) also change by the same multiple, then factor incomes adhere to the same scaling. However, if the outside opportunities do not move in lockstep with productivity, then the break-even level output does not scale with productivity and the size of the industry would change through activation or inactivation of some potential …rms. This in where e¤ort is supplied inelastically, it is worth pointing out as a curiosity that any level of progressivity in income taxation would not reduce e¢ ciency here, as long as the equilibrium matching is not disturbed, i.e., as long as after-tax income is increasing in pre-tax income. 9 An alternative method for deriving the wage equation ( turn could change the division of surplus at all …rms.
Furthermore, if the production function itself is multiplicative, Y (a; b) = ab, then the change in overall productivity is observationally equivalent to the same change having a¤ected all ability levels or all …rm sizes. In this
. If all incomes double, there is no way of telling from income data whether it is due to a doubling of abilities or …rm sizes.
Change in the shape of a distribution The multiplicatively separable production function, which will be used in the empirical part of this paper, lends itself to a simple graphical depiction of the equilibrium and the comparative statics of the model. Figure 1 depicts an example of a matching graph that arises from two particular distributions of factor qualities a and b. The graphical convenience of multiplicativity comes from the fact that the level of output from matching an individual of type a and a …rm of type b is the rectangle between the point fb; ag and the origin. The matching
increasing curve, with slope
Changes in the distribution of either factor quality appear as a change in the shape of the matching graph. (By contrast, uniform productivity growth would merely change the levels of output associated with each isoquant, but have no e¤ect on their shapes or the shape of the matching graph.)
For example, if individuals become more able, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, then the matching graph shifts up. Note, however, that the matching graph alone does not tell how the mass of matched pairs is distributed on top of it, only that there is a positive mass.
The area of the smaller rectangle in Figure 1 . The highest types must be made worse o¤ since all they get is the loss. Of course, if everyone's ability were to increase su¢ ciently, then all individuals can be better o¤. For this it would be necessary for 1 0 To see why this is the case, change the variable of integration in the wage equation (6) from quantile j to ability a: Then j(a) = Fa(a), 3 An Assignment Model for CEOs
The Setup
To adapt the assignment model to the CEO market, two complications must be dealt with. The …rst is that the economic surplus created as a result of the interaction between the current CEO and the …rm is not directly observable.
The market value of a …rm is a¤ected not just by the current CEO but also by the expectations concerning all future CEOs. The second complication 13 is that part of market value may re ‡ect the value of capital that could easily be transferred between …rms. The income to such adjustable factors is not determined within the equilibrium of the assignment problem: The marginal product of adjustable capital is de…ned in the traditional way so every unit of it should expect to earn the same return at every …rm. In this section we show how, under simplifying assumptions, both of these complications a¤ect the empirical interpretation of the assignment model.
Our basic functional form assumption is that ability and …rm size interact multiplicatively. Surplus generated in one period is assumed to be y(a; b) / ab, where b is …rm size and a is management ability. This form covers, without loss of generality, all multiplicatively separable production functions y(a; b) = g(a)h(b), where g and h are strictly increasing. The motivation for selecting the multiplicative form is to use the simplest form that exhibits the complementarity necessary to generate assortative matching. 11
The exogenous component of …rm size, b, describes the potential for surplus that is speci…c to the …rm-we will return to discuss its interpretation in Section 4. 12
Market Value and the E¤ect of CEOs
The relevant management ability a that impacts the current ‡ow of surplus may depend on both past CEOs and the current CEO. We assume that …rms are in…nitely lived and that the e¤ective management ability for surplus in period t at a …rm with a history of CEO abilities of a t ; a t 1 ; a t 2 ; : : : is a weighted average of current and past abilities A t = A(a t ; a t 1 ; a t 2 ; : : :)
The impact weight gives the share of currently e¤ective management ability that comes from the ability of the CEO periods ago. (By the 1 1 In the absence of assortative matching, a more general assignment model can still be relevant, but is likely to yield fewer clear insights. The seminal assignment model of Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) considers a general problem for matching plants and locations in a linear programming framework. 1 2 Note that the distribution of market values is necessarily an equilibrium outcome-it depends on the quality of CEOs that the …rms are able to match with-so it cannot be used as the …rm size variable b in the model. same token, is also the fraction of the current CEO's total impact that occurs periods into the future.) Assuming that the CEO impact fades at a constraint rate , i.e., +1 = = (1 + ), and utilizing the normalization A(a; a; a; : : :) = a, the impact weights are
In the limit of ! 1 CEOs impact only contemporaneous earnings. 13 To keep the model tractable, we make a strong stationarity assumption.
It consists of three parts: 1) The distributions of ability a[i] and …rm size
are constant over time, 2) productivity grows deterministically at rate g at every …rm, and 3) the values of outside opportunities w 0 and 0 grow at rate g. The crucial simpli…cation resulting from this assumption is that all …rms can expect to stay at their current quantile in the distribution of …rm size, and therefore to keep matching with a CEO of the same ability. The surplus generated at a …rm of size b and a current CEO of type a, t periods from now, is therefore
in year-t dollars. The present value of all surplus can now be stated as
where B = (1 + g)=(1 + r) is the growth-adjusted discount factor. The part of this surplus that goes to the …rm is capitalized into market value, but most of the part that goes to CEO pay consists of the pay of future CEOs and is therefore inherently unobservable.
However, we know from Section 2.2, that if the change in productivity is proportional across all units and if the outside opportunities of the factors also increase by the same proportion, then the share of the surplus going to each factor at each quantile i stays the same. In other words, under the strong stationarity assumption, the CEO pay at each …rm is expected to grow at rate g. It follows that the ratio of the current CEO pay to the present value of all (current and future) CEO pay has to equal the "priceearnings"ratio of 1=(1 B). This is how the stationarity assumption allows us to translate the observed ‡ow of CEO pay and the observed stock of market value into common units of measurement that can later be used to calibrate the assignment model. The breakdown of the surplus (14) into factor incomes at …rm i can now be expressed as
where the …rst term is the present value of pay to all CEOs that …rm i will ever employ, and v[i] is the market value of the …rm. The division of this surplus into factor incomes is then determined from the distributions of b and a and their outside opportunities as seen in Section 2.1.
Adjustable Capital
In terms of the theory, the e¤ects of adjustable factors of production have already been "partialled out"of the assignment model: The surplus is de…ned as the maximized surplus, net of the cost of all adjustable inputs. However, when some adjustable inputs are physically or legally embedded in one of the matching parties then they become a potential confounding factor in the empirical analysis. One such input could be the e¤ort of the CEO, but we believe that the variation in CEO e¤ort levels could only explain a trivial fraction of the variation in CEO pay and therefore abstract away from e¤ort choice completely. However, the role of adjustable capital is potentially a signi…cant issue here, so we now explore how the assignment model can be reconciled with the presence of adjustable capital.
The observed market value, to be denoted by v , is in fact a sum of the capitalized economic pro…ts and the value of optimally chosen adjustable capital, k .
Only the "net"market value v is determined from the division of surplus in accordance of the assignment model, whereas adjustable capital must earn the market rate of return r. In order to model the determination of k , we assume that the gross surplus has constant elasticity with respect to adjustable capital. This means that the (net) surplus, that is available to be divided between the …rm and the CEOs, consists of
where the strong stationarity assumption was used for A t = a. By a convenient choice of the constant , 14 the optimal level of adjustable capital can be written as
The maximized surplus is then still
which means that (15) 
, where (20)
Note that, at = 0, all capital is sunk and v 0 = v 0 .
The bottom line is that we remove the confounding e¤ects of adjustable capital by transforming the observed market value into a part that re ‡ects the capitalized income to the …xed factor b; which is determined in the equilibrium of the matching market between …rms and CEOs. The transformation is done via equation (20), so it depends on the assumed values of three parameters: The discount rate r; the growth rate g (embedded in the discount factor B), and the elasticity . The calibrations will be con- 
Empirical Inference of Distributions of Factor Quality
The basic idea for the inference of unobserved abilities comes from the observation that the slopes of the equilibrium factor income pro…les (5) and (7) form a system of two di¤erential equations, while the break-even condition Use Y (a 0 ; a; b) to denote the present value of surplus at a …rm of size b that is in equilibrium matched with ability a, but where the current period CEO is of ability a 0 . Combining (11) and (19), the present value is
where (12) was used in the second step. To apply the equilibrium condition (5) we need the derivative of Y (a 0 ; a; b) with respect to a 0 . Considering that, in equilibrium a 0 = a; the speci…c form of the wage pro…le is now
Since pay levels grow at rate g, the present value of all CEO pay at …rm i is w[i]=(1 B); The rest of the present value of surplus must be capitalized into market value. Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to i and combining it with (22) yields
The last term (obtained after some simpli…cation) re ‡ects the lingering impact of past CEOs. Since the CEOs get paid a ‡ow income, the …rm in e¤ect "lends"the CEOs some of the present value of their impact at the discount rate r.
Finally, the pair of di¤erential equations that describes the equilibrium is given by (22) and (23), and can be solved for 
These impacts can be calculated from the data because they include only the relative factor qualities: The undetermined constants wash out of the predicted economic e¤ects of hypothetical rearrangements of individuals and …rms. 16 It would also be possible, in principle, to analyze the value of the exogenous component in …rm size by considering changes in …rm size while 1 6 Note that, if the model is to be taken seriously, then observed rearrangment of CEOs between …rms only re ‡ects changes in information about their ability and can not help identify the value of ability; although inference from such movements can be sensible within other models (e.g., Hayes and Schaefer, 1999, and Parrino, 1997, whose …ndings support the presence of assortative matching.) 19 holding …xed abilities …xed. However, such results are very sensitive to the assumed model parameters, and will therefore only be mentioned in passing.
What is the Exogenous Component of Firm Size?
The …xed factor embedded in individuals has a very natural interpretation as ability, which obviously can not be removed from one person and grafted it is still e¢ cient to allocate more capital to the management of more able
CEOs, but there is no "assignment" anymore. This is how …rm size di¤er-ences are determined in the classic models of Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) .
(Similar to these models, the assignment model also requires decreasing returns to combining several …rms into the management of a single individual, as otherwise all …rms should be merged to be under the command of the most able CEO.) There the size distribution of …rms (by earnings) is solely a re ‡ection of the economy's solution to allocating productive resources to different managers: if all managers were equally apt, then all …rms would have the same market value. By contrast, in an assignment model, both sides of the match are inherently heterogeneous. This two-sided heterogeneity implies that both sides must earn rents relative to their outside opportunity (except for the lowest types that match). There is a contemporaneous rent to being a …rm in a large niche-partly as the simple Ricardian rent due to occupying an inframarginal niche, and partly because being highly ranked allows a …rm to be matched with a more able CEO. Some of these rents merely compensate for the capital that has been sunk in the past and now show up as part of the …rm's natural scale b. 19 1 8 Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) use regression analysis to …nd that one …fth of the recent increases in executive pay can be attributed to the increase in …rm size as measured by current year sales. We are tempted to speculate that a larger fraction could be attributed to increase in expected future sales. 1 9 By no means does the existence of rents to …rms imply that their owners earn excess returns-these rents should have been capitalized into market value all along. The rent from occupying a lucrative niche should have been dissipated back when it was decided who got to occupy that niche (perhaps in a patent race, or through premature entry, or as a rent to talented or lucky founders).
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5 Empirical Application
Data
The sample comprises the 1000 publicly traded US companies with the largest market value in each year from 1994 to 2004 in the CompuStat database. 20 The variable for CEO pay is total compensation, with options valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula. We measure CEO pay as a …rm-speci…c variable: For …rms that had several CEOs during the same year, their compensation is summed up to measure that year's CEO pay.
We do not consider the incentive structure of CEO pay; what matters for our model is the expected cost of compensation.
In practice, the magnitude of the potential impact of CEO ability in any given …rm depends on many factors, and, even in the absence of stochastic factors, could not be expected to have a perfect rank correlation with market value. However, to calibrate our assignment model, the input data of CEO pay and market value needs to exhibit perfect rank correlation, so the observed noisy relation of CEO pay and market value needs to be smoothed into a strictly monotonic relation. For this purpose we performed a Lowess smoothing of the relation of the levels of CEO pay and the rank by market value (separately for each year). 21 The relationship of CEO compensation and …rm ranking by market value is shown in Figure 2 for 2004. 22 It bears out the well known fact that larger companies pay their CEOs more. The cross-sectional Spearman rank correlation of market value and CEO pay varies between 0:47 and 0:57 during the sample period; this can be considered a "measure of …t" for the key assumption of assortative matching.
In principle, the smoothing could be done the other way around: by …tting the market values against rank by CEO pay. We use the rank by market value as "the true ordering," because as a stock variable it is likely to be a better measure of a …rm's value then a year's ‡ow of CEO pay is a measure of CEO compensation at that …rm. CEO pay is more volatile 2 0 While the data on CEO pay is available from 1992, we drop the …rst two years because they seem to miss many of the smaller companies that should have been in the top 1000. 2 1 Stata implementation was used with bandwidth 0:7 (the smallest to yield strictly increasing …t in every year) and adjustment of means to match the the sample means. For details on Lowess (LOcally WEighted Scatterplot Smoothing), see Cleveland (1979) . 2 2 We de…ne rank such that largest …rm has rank 1, so the relation of rank n 2 f1; : : : ; 1000g and quantile i 2 [0; 1] is n = 1000 999i.
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partly because compensation granted for a given year does not in practice necessarily compensate for the services in that year alone, due to deferred pay and bonuses. 23 From now on, except where explicitly stated, observed or actual distribution of CEO pay refers to the pay levels that have been smoothed in their relation to market value. Since rank by market value is used to order the observations, there is no need to do any smoothing of market values themselves: A simple connect-the-dots interpolation su¢ ces to create continuous distributions.
Cross-Section Results
Role of CEO Ability for Economic Welfare The value of existing ability can only reasonably be measured relative to some hypothetical level of ability that would replace it. In this section we measure the aggregate value of CEO ability in the sample by considering three replacement types for the existing distribution of ability, while the existing distribution of …rm size is kept in place. In each counterfactual, the replacement CEOs at every …rm would be of the same type-the baseline type (from the 1000th largest …rm), the highest type (from the largest …rm), and the median sample type (from …rm 500). 24 Table 1 tabulates the results of these counterfactuals. The results are calculated under four di¤erent combinations of assumed parameter values. 25 In the …rst and the most important case we assume the replacement CEOs to be of the baseline type, i.e., of the type managing the smallest sample …rm. Using data from 2004, the value of existing ability over the baseline level is between $21:3 and $25 billion, depending on the assumed model 2 3 The higher stability of market value is well captured by the fact that the correlation of current and lagged rank by market value is 0:95, while the correlation of current and lagged rank by the CEO pay by …rm is only 0:73. 2 4 The exact median rank among the top 1000 …rms is 500:5; for the sake of brevity we admit a small "rounding error" in the discussion. 
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parameters. For comparison, the actual total pay of the top 1000 CEOs was $7:1 billion. The baseline CEO earned in fact $2:7 million per year: This would be the equilibrium pay of all top 1000 CEOs if they were all of that same type, so the counterfactual total pay of 1000 baseline types is $2:7
billion. 26 The di¤erence, $4:4 billion, is the rent to the scarce ability of the actual top 1000 CEOs, namely the part of their ability that exceeds that of the baseline type. This amounts to between 17% and 21% of the economic value of ability. The rest of the value of ability is left to shareholders, so the implied e¤ect that the CEOs had on shareholder value in 2004 was about $16:9-20:6 billion, which was 0:13-0:16% of the total market capitalization of the largest 1000 …rms. Recall that the value of ability is measured as a ‡ow here: It is the contribution of the current-year CEO to the present value of economic surplus. The implied "stock" value of current and future CEO ability is obtained by dividing the above values by the appropriate discount rate.
The assessed value of ability relative to the baseline types is depicted in Figure 3 for all sample years, using the two parameter assumptions with the most extreme results. The millennium boom/ bubble stands out in the …gure. This could be expected: in our assignment model, thanks to the complementarity between managerial ability and …rm size, increases in expected productivity increase the value of current CEO ability, even if the productivity is only expected to a¤ect future earnings potential. Whether the expectations of growth in productivity are "irrational" or not is a di¤erent question: either way, in competitive equilibrium, more optimistic expectations induce the owners to immediately bid more for the CEOs. This is because current CEO ability interacts with future scale to generate future pro…ts.
The second result in Table 1 shows the optimistic counterfactual: The increase in total surplus, if all top 1000 CEOs were to be replaced with CEOs of the current highest type. In this case the gains are much more modest than the losses in the previous grim scenario: This value is about $3:2-3:4
billion. The gains from improved ability are relatively small because CEO ability is increased the least at the largest …rms where ability is at its most productive, as these managers are already close to the highest type. (By contrast, in the previous counterfactual, the largest decreases in ability took place at the largest …rms, so the total e¤ect was larger.) In this case there would be a jump in the ability pro…le at the baseline, and the resulting jump in surplus would accrue to CEOs so that every CEO in the top 1000 would get paid $2:9-3:4 million more than the best CEO outside the sample. 27
Above the baseline managers are homogeneous and all additional surplus goes to …rms. This improvement in overall ability would melt away most of homogeneous, all of the di¤erence that CEOs make to economic surplus accrues as simple Ricardian talent rents to CEOs, i.e., the di¤erence to surplus made by a CEO would also be the di¤erence in her equilibrium wage compared to the reference CEO. For example, in the middle panel of Figure   4 , the CEO at the median …rm in fact earned about $3.2 million more than the CEO at the baseline, but $12.1 million less than the CEO at the top.
In the counterfactual, these di¤erences would be about $5.5-6.1 and $3.5- Table 2 . These results highlight the overwhelming role of …rm scale in driving the di¤erences in CEO pay. The pessimistic change cuts total rents to ability by more than half, to about $1.7-1.9 billion, whereas the increase in …rm size increases the rents by roughly hundred-fold. The results are fairly robust to the assumed parameter values, except as to their e¤ect on counterfactual market values, which are not the focus here.
We saw before that replacing CEOs by other sample types makes a relatively small di¤erence to total economic surplus. By contrast, a hypothetical variation in the exogenous component of …rm size generates huge di¤erences in pay (and, of course, in market value) . In this sense, the high levels of CEO pay at the top can be said to be mostly due to the exogenous component in …rm scale.
Time Series Results
In this section we investigate whether a simple assignment model with a time-invariant distribution of ability and …rm size is su¢ cient to generate the recent ‡uctuations in the distribution of CEO pay. 29 For this purpose we now calibrate the model over the sample years 1994-2004 under the restriction that distributions of both …xed factors are constant over time.
More speci…cally, we now allow a multiplier in the surplus function to vary freely over time. Thus the (expected present value of) surplus in year t generated at a …rm of type b that hires CEOs of type a is assumed to be
where G t is an economy-wide parameter capturing expected productivity that will also absorb the multiplicative constants in the inferred distributions of a and b. Changes in G are assumed to come as a surprise and expected to stay permanent. In terms of the model, a change in G is observationally equivalent to a proportional across-the-board change in …rm size.
Our favored interpretation is that changes in G capture changes in expected potential for surplus, which depends on expectations about productivity and demand. Reductions in G re ‡ect lowered expectations.
Denote the abilities and …rm sizes inferred from the data in year t by a t and b t ; where distributions for each year are calculated using (24) and (25). We now take the average of the distributions over the sample period Figure 5 shows inferred relative abilities a t [i]=a t [0] from selected quantiles over the sample years, as well as the corresponding averages. Based on a year-by-year inference, the implied relative abilities would be higher during the millennial boom before returning to the previous levels.
The time-varying scaling factor G t is chosen so that predicted total surplus in each year will exactly …t the data, i.e., to satisfy
As market values dwarf CEO pay, the relative changes in the "year e¤ects"
G t are mostly driven by changes in total market value.
After obtaining the time invariant distributionsâ[i] andb [i] , and the time-variant factors G t ; these are then plugged into the equilibrium conditions of the model, (6), (8), and (27), to generate predictions or "…tted values" for the factor income distributions in each year.
The predicted market values are obtained by using the (inverted) equation (20) to add the implied value of adjustable capital tov t . Figure 6 depicts the model's predicted wages over time at selected ranks. 30 The baseline pay levels are taken directly from the data, as the model cannot predict them, only the additional surplus relative to them. Therefore the predictions will necessarily …t exactly at the lowest ranked …rm. 
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There is a time-honored tradition in economics to assume that prices are competitive and re ‡ect all available information, at least as the …rst approach in analyzing price data. This paper has shown how assignment models can be used in this spirit to analyze income data from markets with assortative matching, and developed a theory-driven estimate for the economic impact of CEO ability. The role of ability was studied within the assignment model by evaluating the predicted e¤ects of counterfactual distributions of ability and …rm size on CEO pay and shareholder value.
This paper is merely the …rst attempt in applying an assignment model into the market for CEOs, and leaves in (and hopefully lays bare) the admittedly many strong assumptions utilized to take the model to the data.
Firm size and CEO ability were assumed to interact in a multiplicatively separable fashion, while uncertainty, frictions, incentive problems, complementarities between di¤erent CEOs across time, and many other features were assumed away, to allow the model to stay in a reasonably tractable form. To resolve the problem that the observed market values depend on the expected course of the whole CEO market in the future, the world was assumed to be stationary in a very strong sense: Total factor productivity is assumed to grow at the same deterministic rate at every …rm, and each …rm to match with a CEO of current ability forever. Clearly the empirical results must be taken with a grain of salt: They are simply based on the assumption that the model is true.
We have shown that plausible (i.e., very small) di¤erences in ability among CEOs and a tractable assignment model of CEOs and …rms can together generate the high levels of observed CEO pay as part of a perfectly competitive equilibrium. There are certainly other sensible explanations for the size-pay relationship and the current setup does not allow us to test our model against them. By no means do we claim to have shown that CEOs are not "overpaid" as our assignment model does not allow for that possibility.
(For example, a market-level version of the skimming view could be that there is a "stealing technology" that allows CEOs to steal more at bigger …rms-hence the robust size-pay relation. Presumably this technology would come with some decreasing returns to scale, since the ratio of CEO pay to 30 market value is decreasing in the latter). 32 We believe that the matching of CEOs with exogenously heterogeneous …rms has a genuinely important role in driving the competitive levels of CEO pay, but not that competition is the sole force behind CEO pay. While much work remains to be done, we hope to have shown that assignment models have much to o¤er in helping to understand the determination of CEO pay levels. Value of CEO ability and rents to CEOs relative to baseline ability, at the 1000 largest firms. In "Cross Sections" the profiles of ability are inferred separately in each sample year, whereas in the "Time-invariant" specification the distribution of ability is forced to be constant over time. The parameter assumptions with the most extreme results are shown for both specifications (see Table 1 The counterfactual difference that CEOs would make to economic surplus created at the reference firm if they were to replace the actual CEO at the reference firm. The value is calculated under two assumptions of the model parameters (A and B, defined in Table 1 ). The red line depicts the difference in actual pay of the CEOs relative to that of the reference rank. . The difference in pay between the CEOs of selected ranks and the baseline (1000 th ) CEO. "Actual" pay refers to the smoothed CEO pay and "Modeled" pay refers to the CEO pay level generated by the assignment model while imposing time-invariant distributions of ability and firm size, and size-neutral productivity growth.
3 All values are in 2004 dollars.
